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Abstract  
 The history of military regimes in Nigeria is synonymous with the 
history of suppression, repression, extricable use of violence, impunity and 
blatant trampling on fundamental human rights. Exclusive of J. T. U. Ironsi’s 
short six months in office, every military dictator in Nigeria had propelled 
himself to the rein through dubious and anti-people means. It was therefore 
not fortuitous that these praetorian guards, possessing the powers of ‘life and 
death’, trampled on, subdued, and caged the ‘bloody civilians’ whose social 
contract they had successfully usurped. Being the most affected, Nigerian 
youths had in several scenarios, occasions and events staged protests, 
demonstrations and marches to register their discontentment and resentment 
towards the military dictatorships. The reactions from the military 
governments were always violent, brutal, dreadful and aptly horrific. Military 
regimes went extra miles to enforce authority, legitimacy and acceptability. 
Whether through killing, maiming, blackmailing, bribing or threats, the youths 
had to be forced or cajoled into submission. This work focuses on military 
clampdown on youth demonstrations during the military era. It argues that the 
various repressive regimes had nurtured a docile and sycophantic youths who 
either display lackadaisical attitude over issues bothering social contract or are 
ignorant and nonchalant about governance in the country. Secondary 
evidences are used in the analysis.  
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Introduction: A History of Military Intervention in Nigeria’s Politics 
 The military in every state is supposed to be that unit whose specialty 
resides on the monopoly of violence utilized in protecting a nation when called 
upon to do so. A military officer is supposed to be professional “obedient and 
loyal to the authority of the state, competent in military expertise, dedicated to 
using his skills to provide for the security of the state, and politically and 
morally neutral” (Huntington, 1957:52). 
 The contrary was to be the case in Nigeria, as the British instructors of 
the ‘infant’ Nigerian army were rushed out of the country behind a volatile 
army corps. Upon the departure of Major-General Christopher Earle Welby-
Everard, the ‘Nigerianization’ of the Nigerian army was completed. Yet, the 
army corps was nothing but a miniature of a political party; a seeming time 
bomb. As rightly observed by Siollun (2009:27), the army corps became 
politicized due to the “introduction into the army of university graduates, the 
politicians’ unwise meddling in army affairs, and the government’s use of the 
army to solve political crisis created by it”.  
 Nigeria, upon her independence in 1960 toed the democratic path 
along the British Westminster structures. While Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa 
emerged as the Prime Minister, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe clinched the position of 
the pioneer president of the young nation. Military unprofessionalism 
manifested when some hotheaded youths of the Nigerian military attempted a 
coup on the eve of January 15, 1966; leaving the country in disarray by dawn. 
Casualties of the failed coup included the Prime Minister, Alhaji Tafawa 
Balewa, the Sarduana of Sokoto, Alhaji Ahmadu Bello, the Prime Minister of 
Western Nigeria, Chief Samuel Akintola, the Federal Finance Minister, Chief 
Festus S. Okotie Eboh and high ranking military officers namely: Brigadiers 
S. A. Ademulegun and Z. Maimalari, Colonels Kur Mohammed, Ralph A. 
Shodeinde, Lt. Colonels James Pam, Arthur Unegbe and Abogo Largema 
(Undiyaundeye, 2011). The January 15, 1966 attempted coup was the ultimate 
result of the governance crisis that characterized the first republic’s brief rule. 
Essential among the key issues included the muted confrontation between the 
President and the Prime Minister arising from the 1964 federal elections and 
the rigged western regional elections of 1965 that resulted in the breakdown 
of law and order in the region. The attempted coup was perceived to be ‘Igbo 
coup’ because a chunk of the coup casualties were either northerners or south 
westerners (Aiyede, 2015:100). A unanimous decision by all power blocs in 
the country assented to a brief military intervention to be led by the GOC 
Major-Gen. Ironsi so normalcy could be restored. 
 Upon assumption of office, Major-Gen. Ironsi suspended the 
constitution, promulgated the Unification Decree (Decree 34), failed to try and 
even continued the payment of salaries of the perpetrators of the January 
attempted coup. This provoked the north, created ethnic tensions and incited 
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the fear of an “Igbo planet”. The resentment on the Ironsi’s regime by northern 
soldiers culminated in the infamous Abeokuta mutiny of July 28, 1966 which 
climaxed in the brutal killing of Major-Gen. Aguyi Ironsi and the subsequent 
assumption of power by Lt. Colonel Yakubu Gowon amidst superior officers 
such as Brigadier Ogundipe, Commodore Wey and Colonel Robert Adebayo 
(Siollun, 2011). With the July 1966 mutiny, the cohesion of the army under a 
single command was lost and further deteriorated when Lt. Colonel Ojukwu 
objected to the ascension of Lt. Colonel Gowon as Head of State because the 
later was not the next in command after Major-Gen. Ironsi. Attempts at 
resolving the conflict attained a deadlock with the conflict escalating into a 
civil war in 1967. The Ojukwu led secessionist Independent Republic of Biafra 
was defeated and reincorporated into the Federal Republic of Nigeria by 1970 
(Aiyede, 2015); Gowon had thus consolidated his rule.  
 The Gowon’s regime failure to hand over power to the civilians caused 
disaffection and was subsequently overthrown through a bloodless coup in the 
early hours of July 29, 1975 with General Murtala Muhammed replacing him 
as the Head of State. Murtala Muhammed carried out radical reforms, bizarre 
promotions, excluded some senior officers in the armed forces echelons from 
the Supreme Military Council (SMC) and paid little or no attention to his 
personal security. One day to the 1976 Valentine’s Day, Muhammed was 
murdered by a group of coup plotters led by Lt. Colonel Dimka. This abortive 
action propelled Mohammed’s Second in Command Lt. General Olusegun 
Obasanjo to the position of the Head of State. Lt. Gen. Obasanjo trailed 
Mohammed’s policies and successfully handed over power to the civilian 
government of Alhaji Shehu Shagari in 1979. 
 The short puncture of military rule by the civilians was further 
truncated in December 31, 1983 when the military again struck, replacing 
President Shagari with Major-Gen. Muhammadu Buhari. Buhari’s regime did 
not last long for some obvious reasons, including intra-class struggle within 
the military echelon. Accordingly, another coup in August 27, 1985 replaced 
General Buhari with General Ibrahim Babangida. 
 Babangida ran the nation’s economy aground, implemented the poorly 
timed structural adjustment programme (SAP) and annulled the June 12, 1993 
elections popularly believed to have been won by the late Chief M. K. O. 
Abiola. The agitations, protests and demonstrations against these policies 
mounted pressures on ‘President’ Babangida, leading to his ‘stepping aside’ 
with Ernest Shonekon as head of an interim government on August 17, 1993 
(Siollun, 2013). The interim government having been declared illegal by a 
court of law was sacked weeks after by General Sanni Abacha through a 
bloodless coup. General Abacha demolished all existing democratic structures 
and began fresh plans to succeed himself as a civilian president. His plans 
were frustrated as he died cryptically in June 8, 1998. Abacha was succeeded 
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by another military junta General Abdulsalami Abubakar who swiftly worked 
out modalities for, and transferred power to the civilians in May 29, 1999 
(Aiyede, 2015). So far so good, the civilians have perpetually ruled for about 
seventeen years without interruption. 
  
Military Intervention in Nigeria’s Politics: Coups, Revolutions or Youth 
Activism? 
 The processes that accompany the manifestations of military 
punctuations of civilian rule in Nigeria accommodate variables which could 
qualify it as coups, revolutions or youth activism. The general consensus as 
depicted by literatures on Nigeria’s political and military history embraces and 
portrays the interventions of the praetorian guards majorly as coups while 
negating other variables which could question such analysis. 
 What then is a coup? According to Merriam Webster Dictionary, a 
coup is a “sudden decisive exercise of force in politics especially the violent 
overthrow or alteration of an existing government by a small group”. It is a 
“sudden and decisive action, especially one effecting a change of government 
illegally or by force”. In other words, a coup d’état is characterized by 
“suddenness”, “decisiveness”, “illegality” and “force” (Toyin, 2015). 
Therefore, from the criteria of suddenness, decisiveness, illegality and force, 
one could convincingly assert that of the various processes that led to military 
interventions in Nigerian politics, only that of July, 1975, December, 1983 and 
November, 1993 could be uncontrovertibly qualified as coups. The swift 
process of Murtala Muhammed’s ascendency to power was classy and absorbs 
all the variables of a coup process. The intervention process that propelled 
General Buhari to the reins of power followed a swift path which started 
around 2:30am in December 31st, 1983 and maturated before noon. It was 
sudden (between 2:30am and dawn), decisive (important decisions such as 
the-would-be-leader of the new government was reached before noon), illegal 
(all interventions are against military ethics and are also treason against the 
state) and forceful (President Shagari had spent just three months of the four 
year mandate he was given before being pushed out). In the same vein, Enerst 
Shonekon being General Babangida’s ‘step aside’ stooge was also muscled 
out in the same manner described above in November, 1993. 
 What transpired therefore in the dark hours of January 15, 1966 and 
July 28, 1966 were but attempted coups, bereaved of suddenness, 
decisiveness, but forceful and illegal. Though several politicians met their 
untimely sepulcher in the January, 1966 attempted coup, the ringleaders could 
not consolidate on their gains for obvious reasons. It therefore took the 
agreement of the civilians and some high ranking military officers for a 
civilian backed military dictatorship to be established. Similarly, the July, 
1966 intervention cannot be qualified as a coup since it began as a mutiny 
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which could only maturate to another military intervention three days after the 
mutiny. That is to say that the January 15 and July 28 upheavals were 
attempted coups which though forceful and illegal were not decisive and swift. 
They are often wrongly classed as coups because their compounding melee 
climaxed in power change. 
 Moreso, some variables also fixates military interventions in the milieu 
of overzealousness on the path of young Nigerian revolutionaries in the army 
attempting to force restructuring and reforms on the Nigerian polity. For 
instance, the young and hotheaded majors (in 1966) were frustrated and 
resentful of the civilian corrupt and inept regime and they hoped to unravel 
major structural changes through intervention. The Ring leader of the January 
15 coup Major Nzeogwu (39 years) was resolute that the process he initiated 
was not a coup but a revolution to rid the country of “looting, arson, 
homosexuality, rape, embezzlement, bribery or corruption, obstruction of the 
revolution, sabotage, subversion, false alarm and assistance to foreign 
invaders”. He hoped to run the government through the “Supreme Council of 
the Revolution of the Nigerian Armed Forces” and warned foreign countries 
to “avoid taking sides with the enemies of the revolution and enemies of the 
people”. A semblance of Nzeogwu’s revolutionary thought was conspicuous 
in the Lt. Col. Anthony Nyiam/Major Gideon Orka (38 years) attempted coup 
of April 22, 1990 which demarcated a line for either resource control (among 
states) or the severance of the northern region from Nigeria. On this level of 
analysis, the plotters envisaged themselves as nationalists and revolutionaries 
who were nostalgic of, and hoped to replicate the feats of military politicians 
such as Gamel Nasser, Kemal Ataturk, Fidel Castro, Napoleon Bonaparte, 
Muhammed Ali, etc. However, scholars such as Enor & Ebaye (2011) have 
argued that the process of military intervention in politics in itself negates a 
populist social revolution and forecloses the chances of structural change by 
the people. 
 Of the various processes that crystallized in military assumption of 
power in Nigeria, the July 1966 limbo represents the most conspicuous youth 
activism in this manner. Here, aggrieved NCOs of northern extraction (all 
below the ages of 30 years), frustrated by the fact that Lt. Gen Ironsi after the 
January 1966 abortive coup had failed to try the murderers of their military 
and civilian leaders, staged a wild ‘protest’ where hundreds of the ‘culprits’ 
(easterners) including Aguiyi Ironsi were brutally murdered (Siollun, 2011). 
Though the activism of these northern NCOs were rather regionalistic than 
nationalistic, it does not however, dent the fact that it was a youth’s protest 
against the slow and reactionary policies of the Ironsi regime. This protest-go-
bad saw a massive shakeup of the Nigerian polity as the northern NCOs held 
the country to ransom for over 50 hours. It was not until their perceived 
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messiah in the person of Lt. Colonel Yakubu Gowon consolidated power that 
enduring peace could return. 
 
Military Policies and Youth Activism: A Discourse on Nigeria’s 
Repressive Regimes 
 Military regimes across the globe are more often than not, tantamount 
to repression and epitomize blatant negation of fundamental human rights. In 
the Nigerian political climate, military regimes upon assuming office, first set 
aside the constitution “to pave way for its replacement by decrees, which are 
characteristically draconian and anti—human rights” (Animashaun, 2015:61). 
These decrees which are often intrinsic and inevitable at ridiculing the 
judiciary have ardent repercussions on freedom, human rights, and all that 
democracy stands for. With lines of clearly defined sophistry and arsenal of 
sophisticated weaponry, leaders of military regimes become demigods whose 
powers and authority, only death can challenge. Under such prevailing 
quagmire, the citizens are deluded in the false hope and fantasy of reforms, 
yet, sapped by the draconian and insidious military regimes until they elapse 
their elasticity limit. The resultant or aftereffect is always resentment and 
demonstration against the military government and its policies. 
 Not a single military administration in Nigeria from 1966 to 1999 can 
be exonerated from the guilt of draconian and obnoxious decrees. However, 
some regimes were outstanding in their anti-human rights barbarism. As 
observed by Dada (2013), Yakubu Gowon alone promulgated about a hundred 
and forty (140) of such decrees which trampled on human rights and civil 
justice. Examples included Armed Forces and Police (Special Powers) Decree 
which gave the Inspector General of Police discretional power of arrest and 
detention; and Federal Military (Supremacy and Enforcement of Powers) 
Decrees, which completely ousted the jurisdiction of the court in matters 
within its contemplations. The Murtala/Obasanjo administration was not 
exempted from such albatross decrees. Under this regime, civil servants were 
compulsorily retired without due process while the Nigeria Security 
Organization’s (NSO) detention camp at Ita-oko was saturated with arrested 
dissidents. 
 General Muhammadu Buhari began his administration by suspending 
the constitution after which he consolidated on the notoriety of his 
predecessors. His repressive decrees included the Public Officer (Protection 
Against False Accusation) Decree which placed the onus of proving innocence 
on the accused for a publication that brought a public officer to disrepute; the 
Recovery of Public Property (Special Military Tribunals) Decree and Special 
Military Tribunal (Miscellaneous Offenses) which both had retroactive effects 
and imposed heavy penalties; the State Security Detention Decree legalized 
arrest and detention of persons without trial. Buhari’s other obnoxious decrees 
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included Public Officers (Special Provision) Decree and Civil Service 
Commission and other Statutory Body etc. (Removal of Certain Persons from 
Office) Decree (Dada, 2013:6). It is important to note that successive regimes 
either modified or blatantly adopted these decrees to concretize their positions 
of authority. 
 It is pertinent to clearly state here that the youths dominated the pre-
1999 Nigeria’s political clime. They were the most hit, the most aggrieved and 
the most ostensive. In fact, it was always the students at various Nigerian 
universities and most of their socialist inclined professors that frustrated some 
the most obnoxious military policies through outright protests. During this 
period, the Nigerian youths in different polytechnics, colleges and universities 
had given the military governments a ‘hunchback’ such that every military 
administration was so much interested in, and even infiltrated student’s 
campus politics. When infiltration failed, the last resort was always force. The 
situation is best represented in Mihyo’s position thus: 
Political elite have found students and staff quite an irritant, 
and the only vocal and publicly dissenting voice. It has not 
hesitated, often in haste to mobilize and unleash the force of 
the state repression on the students and faculty (Mihyyo, 
1991:4). 
 When the nefarious Decree No.4, also known as Public Officer 
(Protection Against False Accusation) Decree was promulgated, the youths in, 
and outside the university environment protested against it. Young and vibrant 
journalists, students, workers, politicians and ‘ordinary’ citizens resented the 
law. Among the conspicuous youth organizations which called for the 
immediate abrogation of that decree included the National Association of 
Nigerian Students (NANS), the Student Press Club of the Polytechnics, 
Ibadan, students from other universities including (but not limited to) 
University of Lagos, Yaba College of Technology and Obafemi Awolowo 
University (Ogbondah, 1988). Consequently, there was an armed intervention 
in the Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, resulting in the loss of 15 students’ 
lives. The revolt then spread to other 19 universities in Nigeria. 
Demonstrations at Universities in Nigeria in May/June 1989 cost 22 students’ 
lives according to official estimates, while unofficial sources estimated the 
number of deaths to be nearly 100 (Balsvik, 1998). From the statistics 
presented by Etadon, 14 students were casualties of student unrest between 
1976 and 1986 in University of Ibadan. Another 33 students died between 
1986 and 1996 in the process of students’ violent conflict in Nigeria. 
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Table 1: Victims of Students’ unrest between 1976 and 1986,, UI, Ibadan 
S/N YEAR NO. OF STUDENTS 
1 1971 1 
2 1976 4 
3 1981 4 
4 1986 5 
Source: Etadon, 2013 Ctd. in Akinrole et. al., 2014:363 
 
 To further incapacitate university youths, the Ibrahim Babangida 
dictatorship 
…created a panel to investigate the cause of the crisis in 
Ahhmadu Bello University Zaria which led to the shooting and 
death of several students by law enforcement agents. The panel 
accused the lecturers in the University of Not teaching “what 
they are paid to teach” and recommended that the government 
should follow up this accusation…The SSS agents, disguised 
as students, invaded the universities, monitoring teachers and 
students and filling reports to the authorities. In 1988…without 
prior warning, Dr. Patrick Wilmot, a political science lecturer 
at Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria was deported to London by 
the SSS in violation of his rights and personal security 
(Ugochukwu, 1997:87). 
 A number of lecturers in universities of Ibadan and Calabar, inclined 
to the leftist philosophy and regarded as being unpatriotic on the advice of the 
NSO were either blacklisted or discharged. Courses that bordered on social 
contracts, sharpened the students’ consciousness, and solidified students’ 
ideology were either modified or disbanded.   
 Some of the military administrative policies were so irritating, 
exasperating and directionless that it curled criticism from all and sundry. The 
military administrators were labeled brain death by some of it critics such as 
the Song writer, Fela Anikulapo Kuti whose “Government of the Crooks” 
vituperated thus: 
This is my country  
Nobody suppose harass me 
Police and soldier no go gree, 
For my country o 
Zombie wan be oga, 
How zombie can be oga 
Zombie na zombie   
This is my country  
Nobody is supposed to harass me 
But policemen and soldiers won’t let it 
For my country o  
Soldiers want to be the boss 
How can soldiers be the boss? 
A soldier is a soldier  
Source: Eesuola, (2015:85) 
 
 In May/June 1989, the Nigerian youths took to the street to register 
their discontentment of the Babangida’s Structural Adjustment Programme 
(SAP). The SAP protest spilled over from university campuses into the streets. 
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Defying the intimidation of the generals, students stormed the streets, 
demanding the reason for the selective suffering; for while they wallowed in 
poverty, the first family was in affluence with monies stocked in foreign 
accounts. The anger of the youths was that while Nigerians had been suffering 
the effects of SAP, their leaders were quite comfortable. The military 
government in its routine manner responded by closing down six universities 
for one session. This was arbitrary and unconstitutional since “education”, 
argued Eboh (1990:28) “is a citizen’s right, not rewards for docility”. The 
climax of the whole drama was that the military government was pressured 
into introducing short welfare packages to create jobs, feed the hungry and 
ameliorate the transportation situation in the country. 62,000 jobs were to be 
created in six months while the Works ministry was to provide additional jobs 
for 10,120 non-graduates, engineers and surveyors within six months (Eboh, 
1990:30-31). According to Balsvik (1998), 21 universities were closed down 
for five months after the anti-SAP demonstration. 
 When the military government in June, 1993 displayed its age long 
treachery of prolonging swift transition to civilian rule, the youths were 
viscous and intransigent in demanding for a civilian government. As reported 
by Human Rights Watch (1994), a number of students and others were killed 
in Edo State in reprisal attacks while homes of opposition leaders were 
bombed by unknown assailants. In the same demonstration in Lagos and other 
southern cities, soldiers are reported to have killed more than 150 people. The 
pro-democracy group National Democratic Coalition (NADECO) was 
declared illegal in the same month (May, 1993) of its foundation. When 
members of the disbanded Senate threatened to reconvene on a stipulated date, 
they were arrested and detained for weeks while about 13 of them charged 
with treason remained incarcerated for nearly two months. As part of the 
demonstration against the Military government’s rascality, the National Union 
of Petroleum Gas workers (NUPENG) proceeded on industrial action on July 
4, 1993. The Abacha junta, hurt by the action resorted to “bribes, threats, 
arrest, and eventually, when these methods failed, he dissolved the leadership 
of the oil union and ordered workers back to work”. The Labour Minister, 
reacting to the above incident averred that the government is on a find, fix and 
finish mission, hence, all voices of opposition will be “exterminated even if 
they go underground in such a way that history will not remember that they 
even existed”. 
 As the hub of the demonstration consciousness, the National Union of 
Teachers (NUT) and the Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU) also 
went on strike. The government however reacted by closing down some 
universities even before the commencement of the strike action. Protest by 
students of Obafemi Awolowo University (OAU) was met with brutal attack 
by armed policemen. In their known modus operandi; 
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Many people were savagely beaten with whips and gun butts. 
Others were locked in unventilated rooms into which teargas 
canisters were thrown. Many residents were robbed and had 
their homes and other property vandalized and partially 
destroyed (Human Right Watch, 1994). 
 In the University of Benin, students reacted, in August 17, 1993, by 
joining other civilians in a violent protest and attacks at homes of serving and 
former government officials. The police responded by assaulting two 
universities in the city and admitted killing four students. Many female 
students were raped and the casualty figure was routinely deflated. The 
military government also arbitrarily arrested and detained hundred of 
dissidents including Anthony Enahoro, Gani Fawehinmi, Ken Wiwa, etc. It is 
important to note that: 
Detainees have included children as young as ten years of age. 
At the demonstration of July 18, twenty-eight persons, most of 
them children under the age of fifteen and some as young as 
ten years old, were arrested (Human Right Watch, 1994). 
 The youths throughout the entire debacle of military rule were a 
nightmare to various military administrations. They were adamant, obstinate, 
intransigent, and were all out in number to regain their social contract. Armed 
with the right consciousness that power belongs to the people; and angered by 
the scenario that “Nigeria was a colony of military generals administered by 
the rank and file in the military” (Eesuola, 2015:79), the youths sacrificed their 
lives, happiness and time to wrestle Nigeria from the dungeon the military had 
left it. Their courage and perseverance depicted patriotism and nationalism. 
But for the role of the youths, scholars such as Eesuola (2015) believe Nigeria 
would have still been in the abyss of military dictatorship. 
 
The Enduring Legacies of the Repressive Military Policies in post-1999 
Nigerian Youths  
 The implications of the Nigerian military draconian regimes on the 
post 20th century Nigerian youths have manifested in diverse forms and 
dimensions, with the most conspicuous being on the political environment. 
The covert and overt state terror perpetrated by the agents of the military 
regimes was not without attending psychological impact. Brutal and naked 
force unleashed on innocent and young activists as well as university students 
culminated in a confluence of divergent cause and effect connections. Amidst 
the pool of aggrieved youths that ‘fought’ the military dictators, four 
categories had subconsciously emerged before the year 1999 when the military 
capitulated. They were: the Messengers, the Sycophants, the Cowards, and the 
Faithfuls.  
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 The Messengers are those who subscribed to the aphorism “if you 
cannot fight them, join them”. This category of youths had either through the 
horrific experience in their clash with the military “terrorists” or their personal 
experiences, acquired and mastered enduring skills at unleashing brutality 
which was very useful to the military intelligence. They were bankrolled and 
assigned different assignments ranging from orderlies to administrative moles 
in various government parastatals, agencies and tiers of government. There is 
every indication that most of the atrocities perpetuated by the military Juntas 
were neither executed directly by the NSO or the SSS but by the Messengers. 
 The Sycophants represents a group whose position boomeranged from 
criticism to hailing of every step and policies advanced by the military 
governments. This group became the propaganda driving machine who did all 
it could to portray the military dynasties as infallible. A greater number of 
membership of this group came from SSS infiltration of Student Union 
Governments across many Nigerian tertiary institutions. This group soared 
during the regimes of President Babangida and General Sani Abacha. Both 
used astronomical amount of money to lure people to do their biddings in the 
name of “settlement”. It is little wonder that the Senate President Iyorchia Ayu 
was impeached by the Nigerian Senate for opposing moves to extend 
Babangida’s tenure beyond August 27, 1993; and all the political parties in 
1998 collapsed their structures for the emergence of General Abacha as a sole 
candidate for the anticipated general elections. 
Figure 1: Showing the Psychological Impact of Repressive Military Policies on the Post 
1999 Nigerian Youths 
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The Cowards were the youths who never summoned the courage and 
those who could no longer withstand the terrific scenes of the military brutal 
actions. They were largely indifferent, and mostly apathetic in reacting to 
situations, even the ones with direct implications on them. They were not 
resilient and had succumbed to the military’s notion of peaceful protest being 
treasonable and anti-state. Without much fight, for fear of their lives, they 
accepted the military echelons’ position of demigods and were ready to 
worship them, if need be. As general Abacha became very aggressive, 
gruesome and unpredictably dangerous, this group multiplied in millions. 
 The Faithfuls were the ardent, incorruptible and pious group who were 
ready to lay their lives to wrestle the country from the den of the praetorian 
guards. Sadly, the composition of this group had diminished in a seemingly 
direct proportion to Babangida and Abacha autocracies.  
 In synopsis, the first three groups, that is, Messengers, Sycophants and 
Cowards have advanced their respective skills in the post 20th century 
Nigeria’s political clime. While the Messengers are now consolidating on their 
positions in the government, the Sycophants have innovated their realm, skills 
and technologies with much ado and advanced budgetary allocations from the 
government. The Ministry of Information and Communication has become so 
crucial that its budget runs into billions of Naira. The Cowards are exceedingly 
indifferent, lackadaisical and ill-informed. They are easily manipulated by the 
Sycophants while they know a pinch of government policies and how it affects 
them. They perpetually question nothing but go with the bandwagon views on 
any trending issue. These three groups do not care about the wellbeing of the 
country, if they are governed well, if their leaders are sincere and are 
accountable, or if the terms of the social contract are strictly followed. All they 
are interested in is their personal survival and self-preservation. The Faithfuls, 
though a handful, had placed so much confidence on the anticipated civilian 
government such that they washed off their feet from healthy protest and 
demonstration to keep successive government on toes. While it is difficult to 
rally this caliber around as in the military era where there was a common 
enemy, regional, ethnic, tribal and religious differences have triumphed over 
objective reasoning; this group is thus in the brink of extinction. 
 
Disarticulation  
 When in 1999, the military junta of General Abdulsalami Abubakar 
handed over power to a repented democrat, Olusegun Obasanjo, the nation’s 
economy was in shambles, the military was still on alert with much ado for an 
opportunity to intervene; the polity was very much fragile, enmeshed in a high 
level of tension and uncertainty. Thus, amidst eyesores of monumental 
corruption, human rights violations, dent in electioneering process and 
political assassinations, the Obasanjo civilian government enjoyed massive 
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support because to the Faithfuls, “the worst civilian government is better than 
the best military dictatorship”. The advent of President Umaru Musa 
Yar’Adua in 2007 signaled hope. His pacification of the Niger Delta region 
through the famous amnesty programme reshaped the economy while giving 
the nation a direction. Yar’Adua’s subsequent incapacitation and death in 
2010 parachuted Dr. Goodluck Jonathan to the helms of affairs as the 
succeeding president. The Jonathan’s administration was marred with 
monumental corruption. Amidst swelling oil prices, the state treasury was in 
a flux of depletion while corruption was unofficially ‘legalized’ (See Ekpo et 
al, 2016)c. But for the vibrant economy it left and upholding of human rights, 
his government was on the same level with that of the military regimes in 
mortgaging the future of Nigerians. 
 In what the author considers one of the wonders of the 21st century, 
General Muhammadu Buhari won the 2015 presidential race; but not without 
series of clearly defined stratagem, subterfuge, and sophistry advanced by his 
political party. This is more so as the Buhari civilian government has 
contradicted everything it stood for during its campaign days. The country’s 
economy is in a putrid state as the value of the nation’s currency is on a freefall 
in the global currency exchange market. Imported goods have attained 200-
300% increase in prices. In fact, the nation’s economy is on a hyperinflation 
and the brunt of it all is on the common man. The country’s wavering 
economic and exchange policies have culminated in the collapse of, and 
massive retrenchment by some firms. While hundreds of Foreign Direct 
Investments (FDIs) have pulled out, hundreds are reconsidering their decisions 
to move in. The few establishments operating are downsizing while anxiously 
waiting for the vacillating government policies to stabilize. Power generation 
has remained a ‘rocket science’ while the government has preposterously 
removed subsidy on fuel without adequate and tangible palliatives. The 
depressed economy has caused staple foods to become luxuries for the 
common man; in fact, affording a three square meal recently in some part of 
the country is a miracle that warrants testimonies. Life has become so difficult 
that even a deaf and dump Nigerian feels the difference between the present 
administration and its predecessor. Yet, the Presidency in the 2017 
Appropriation Bill, as reported by VanguardNews Online, (24th December, 
2016) has proposed N6.5 billion for capital expenditure, N100.8 million for 
kitchen equipment, N967 million for personal food supply, N198 million for 
buses and SUVs, N103.9 million for computers and a monumental N4.95 
billion  for annual maintenance of Aso Rock Villa.  
 The irony remains that things weren’t this bad when the youths 
protested vehemently against the Babangida’s Structural Adjustment 
Programme for the anger of the youths then was that “while Nigerians had 
been suffering the effect of SAP, their leaders were quite comfortable” (Eboh, 
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1990:30). In fact, the French, Russian and Chinese economies were not this 
vandalized when the citizens rose up to demand the termination of their social 
contracts with the handlers of those economies. 
 Moreso, in Nigeria today, there is a new meaning and definition of 
“anti-corruption” – an apt replica of the military regimes’ anti-corruption 
jamboree and rhetoric that infuriated the then Nigerian youths. The 
presidency, its associates, ruling party bigwigs and affiliates, ‘top’ government 
officials and friends of the government are saintly and holy. According to 
President Buhari, the brunt of proving the corruptibility of any of his ministers 
is on the whistle blowers. This is a semblance of the infamous Decree No.4 
(Protection Against False Accusation) which the pre-millennial youths 
ferociously condemned and energetically protested against. Interestingly, 
opposition party men that are yet to carpet cross are hunted down on a 
seemingly premeditated vendetta mission. Anyone that is opposed to the 
government’s policies is hunted down by the state security service (SSS). Just 
like the pre-1999 years, there is rare room for opposition. Distinguished 
dissidents such as Nnamdi Kanu of the IPOB are incarcerated in defiance to 
court orders for their freedom. The camouflage of anti-corruption fight is 
utilized in caging the judiciary and the opposition. While corruption cases 
involving the ruling party officials are fought with deodorants, that involving 
the opposition is fumigated with biological weapons. The days of freedom of 
information are far gone. The prevailing scenario is best explained by the 
epigram that one’s freedom of speech is sacrosanct but freedom after speech 
is that not guaranteed. Infact, qualifying the existing order as being “pseudo 
democratic” will be an understatement.  
 The teaser therefore is, why has the youths largely remained calm, 
comfortable, satisfied and lethargic amidst objective conditions for 
demonstrations? The answer is glaring and is a reminiscent of the Messenger, 
Sycophants, Cowards, and Faithfuls analogy earlier registered in this work. It 
is further hinted in Ojo (2008:15) submission that: 
…many years of military dictatorship has left some 
psychological scars in the minds of the generality of the 
Nigerian populace and this has weakened that inherent 
disposition of the youths to agitate for change. 
 Judging by the findings of this work so far, it appears there is no hope 
for the Nigerian youths in particular and Nigeria at large. A larger percentage 
of the Nigerian youths have been reduced from their legitimate position of 
patriots to mere praise singing parrots. Their sense of reason has been clouded 
by religious, ethnic and regional sentiments. As majority of the Yoruba youths 
hailed all the moves made by the Obasanjo civilian government, the Niger 
Delta youths even threatened to “go back to the creeks” in defense of “their 
son” President Jonathan. Interestingly, millions of Nigerian youths have 
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subscribed to the #ISTANDWITHBUHARI group, while another million are 
empathetic to it cause of defending the plague of a Buhari government and 
their quest at portraying it infallible. The truth is, none of the youths after the 
repressive military regimes are ready to stand with Nigeria. Their conscience, 
consciousness and nationalistic ideals are poisoned with the effluvium from 
age long ethnic, religious, and regional sentiments. The youths are now the 
Messengers of their regional godfathers. They unleash avalanche of 
propaganda to shape public opinion and wield tribal sentiments when their 
godfathers are trapped by the law. They have euphemized their cowardice at 
standing with Nigeria for loyalty to their regional godfathers. Patriotic youths 
in the Nigerian polity are now a seldom commodity – as rare as oasis in the 
Kalahari Desert. This situation is not unconnected to the military repressive 
policies. It could be safe to posit that the above mentioned condition is a legacy 
of military terrorism against the pre-millennial Nigerian youths. Docility and 
sycophancy than any other political disease, is now highly communicable and 
made worse by the low standard of education in the country by which educated 
illiterates are churned out in their number yearly. 
 
Conclusion: Any Hope for Nigeria?  
The lethargy and dormancy which the post-1999 Nigerian youths have 
exhibited over issues bothering social contract has become so discomfiting 
that observers could mistake it for paralysis. When the country’s hard earned 
democracy was at the brink of collapse, following the seizure of power by 
President Yar’Adua kitchen cabinet upon his incapacitation, and the resulting 
quagmire which would have seen the spying military takeover power, the 
youths remained the apologetic onlookers while the ‘old boys’ strove and 
successfully restored normalcy. It took the agitations of the NADECO old 
boys such as Prof. Soyinka for power to be handed over to the then Vice 
President Dr. Goodluck Jonathan to govern on acting capacity. Similarly, 
while it dawned on Nigerians that the proposed and subsequently implemented 
removal of subsidy on petroleum products on January 1, 2012 would hurt 
them, it took the faces of the old boys as Prof. Soyinka and Pastor Tunde 
Bakare to organize and escalate the famous #OCCUPYNIGERIA which 
forced the Jonathan’s government to reconsider the policy.  
Unlike the military era, agitations and demonstrations instigated and 
fronted by the youths have become so rare that one found is considered an 
anomaly. However, the story is gradually changing. Recently, the popular 
Nigerian musician Innocent Idibia generally addressed as Tuface had on 
January 25th, 2017, announced a nationwide protest against obnoxious All 
Progressive Congress (APC) led government. According to him, the planned 
protest was to be; 
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…a call for good governance. A call for urgent explanation into 
the reckless economic downtown nationwide. A call for a 
nationwide protest as we say no to the Executive, no to the 
Legislatures, no to the Judiciary…You have all failed us. We 
the people are tired. We can no longer continue with all of you. 
All your excuses and mistakes are not funny. We do not wish 
to continue with a system and government that is not working 
but afflicting the people. We the people of this country… have 
now accepted to take the bull by the horn to come out and 
protest this obnoxious and baseless policies and excuses of the 
government of the day…  
A careful look at this protest call by Idibia shows a vibrant articulation 
and comprehension of the prevailing disaster of a government led by President 
Muhammadu Buhari. The objective conditions raised by Mr. Idibia are quite 
evidenced and legitimate. It is also reflective of the fact that though Nigerian 
youths remain ostensively docile, they still feel the pains and can articulate 
them, at least in theory. The unfortunate epilogue is that Mr. Idibia was 
reduced to, and suffocated with hate speeches, condemnations, rebukes, 
threats and blackmail. As a youth whose best category the Coward defines, 
Idibia first postponed the protest date from February 5th to February 6th but 
later capitulated to pressures by calling off the protest for security reasons. 
 It appears the youths are recuperating from the psychological amnesia 
advanced them by successive military regimes; though the recuperation is 
quite slow and sluggish. The bottom line here is that dormancy should not be 
interpreted as death and docility should not be perceived as paralysis. All 
sundry should know that a day will come when the intestine will no longer 
need the support of the anus to cause constipation. A day will also come when 
the men in the youths who have ‘died’ will resurrect and go all out to retrieve 
their social contract. A day will come when out of strain, excess adrenalin will 
propel cowards and sycophants into demanding for that which is rightly theirs. 
This paper thus, is a wakeup call for both policy makers and the youths alike. 
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